Biden intends to appoint Dr. Reenee Wegrzyn, a former scientist with DARPA, as the inaugural director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health (ARPA-H). Her specialties are synthetic biology, genetic engineering and data collection through biosurveillance. ARPA-H will be a swarming hive for Transhumanist scientists and projects. ⁃ TN Editor
Last Wednesday, President Biden was widely praised in mainstream and health-care–focused media for his call to create a “new biomedical research agency” modeled after the US military’s “high-risk, high-reward” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA. As touted by the president, the agency would seek to develop “innovative” and “breakthrough” treatments for cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, and diabetes, with a call to “end cancer as we know it.”
Far from “ending cancer” in the way most Americans might envision it, the proposed agency would merge “national security” with “health security” in such as way as to use both physical and mental health “warning signs” to prevent outbreaks of disease or violence before they occur. Such a system is a recipe for a technocratic “pre-crime” organization with the potential to criminalize both mental and physical illness as well as “wrongthink.”
The Biden administration has asked Congress for $6.5 billion to fund the agency, which would be largely guided by Biden’s recently confirmed top science adviser, Eric Lander. Lander, formerly the head of the Silicon Valley–dominated Broad Institute, has been controversial for his ties to eugenicist and child sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein and his relatively recent praise for James Watson, an overtly racist eugenicist. Despite that, Lander is set to be confirmed by the Senate and Congress and is reportedly significantly enthusiastic about the proposed new “health DARPA.”
This new agency, set to be called ARPA-H or HARPA, would be housed within the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and would raise the NIH budget to over $51 billion. Unlike other agencies at NIH, ARPA-H would differ in that the projects it funds would not be peer reviewed prior to approval; instead hand-picked program managers would make all funding decisions. Funding would also take the form of milestone-driven payments instead of the more traditional multiyear grants.
ARPA-H will likely heavily fund and promote mRNA vaccines as one of the “breakthroughs” that will cure cancer. Some of the mRNA vaccine manufacturers that have produced some of the most widely used COVID-19 vaccines, such as the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine, stated just last month that “cancer is the next problem to tackle with mRNA tech” post-COVID. BioNTech has been developing mRNA gene therapies for cancer for years and is collaborating with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to create mRNA-based treatments for tuberculosis and HIV.
Other “innovative” technologies that will be a focus of this agency are less well known to the public and arguably more concerning.
The Long Road to ARPA-H
ARPA-H is not a new and exclusive Biden administration idea; there was a previous attempt to create a “health DARPA” during the Trump administration in late 2019. Biden began to promote the idea during his presidential campaign as early as June 2019, albeit using a very different justification for the agency than what had been pitched by its advocates to Trump. In 2019, the same foundation and individuals currently backing Biden’s ARPA-H had urged then president Trump to create “HARPA,” not for the main purpose of researching treatments for cancer and Alzheimer’s, but to stop mass shootings before they happen through the monitoring of Americans for “neuropsychiatric” warning signs.
Still from HARPA’s video “The Patients Are Waiting: How HARPA Will Change Lives Now”, Source: http://harpa.org
For the last few years, one man has been the driving force behind HARPA—former vice chair of General Electric and former president of NBCUniversal, Robert Wright. Through the Suzanne Wright Foundation (named for his late wife), Wright has spent years lobbying for an agency that “would develop biomedical capabilities—detection tools, treatments, medical devices, cures, etc.—for the millions of Americans who are not benefitting from the current system.” While he, like Biden, has cloaked the agency’s actual purpose by claiming it will be mainly focused on treating cancer, Wright’s 2019 proposal to his personal friend Donald Trump revealed its underlying ambitions.
As first proposed by Wright in 2019, the flagship program of HARPA would be SAFE HOME, short for Stopping Aberrant Fatal Events by Helping Overcome Mental Extremes. SAFE HOME would suck up masses of private data from “Apple Watches, Fitbits, Amazon Echo, and Google Home” and other consumer electronic devices, as well as information from health-care providers to determine if an individual might be likely to commit a crime. The data would be analyzed by artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms “for early diagnosis of neuropsychiatric violence.”
The Department of Justice’s pre-crime approach known as DEEP was activated just months before Trump left office; it was also justified as a way to “stop mass shootings before they happen.” Soon after Biden’s inauguration, the new administration began using information from social media to make pre-crime arrests as part of its approach toward combatting “domestic terror.” Given the history of Silicon Valley companies collaborating with the government on matters of warrantless surveillance, it appears that aspects of SAFE HOME may already be covertly active under Biden, only waiting for the formalization of ARPA-H/HARPA to be legitimized as public policy.
The national-security applications of Robert Wright’s HARPA are also illustrated by the man who was its lead scientific adviser—former head of DARPA’s Biological Technologies Office Geoffrey Ling. Not only is Ling the main scientific adviser of HARPA, but the original proposal by Wright would have Ling both personally design HARPA and lead it once it was established. Ling’s work at DARPA can be summarized by BTO’s stated mission, which is to work toward merging “biology, engineering, and computer science to harness the power of natural systems for national security.” BTO-favored technologies are also poised to be the mainstays of HARPA, which plans to specifically use “advancements in biotechnology, supercomputing, big data, and artificial intelligence” to accomplish its goals.
The direct DARPA connection to HARPA underscores that the agenda behind this coming agency dates back to the failed Bio-Surveillance project of DARPA’s Total Information Awareness program, which was launched after the events of September 11, 2001. TIA’s Bio-Surveillance project sought to develop the “necessary information technologies and resulting prototype capable of detecting the covert release of a biological pathogen automatically, and significantly earlier than traditional approaches,” accomplishing this “by monitoring non-traditional data sources” including “pre-diagnostic medical data” and “behavioral indicators.”
While nominally focused on “bioterrorist attacks,” TIA’s Bio-Surveillance project also sought to acquire early detection capabilities for “normal” disease outbreaks. Bio-Surveillance and related DARPA projects at the time, such as LifeLog, sought to harvest data through the mass use of some sort of wearable or handheld technology. These DARPA programs were ultimately shut down due to the controversy over claims they would be used to profile domestic dissidents and eliminate privacy for all Americans in the US.
That DARPA’s past total surveillance dragnet is coming back to life under a supposedly separate health-focused agency, and one that emulates its organizational model no less, confirms that many TIA-related programs were merely distanced from the Department of Defense when officially shut down. By separating the military from the public image of such technologies and programs, it made them more palatable to the masses, despite the military remaining heavily involved behind the scenes. As Unlimited Hangout has recently reported, major aspects of TIA were merely privatized, giving rise to companies such as Facebook and Palantir, which resulted in such DARPA projects being widely used and accepted. Now, under the guise of the proposed ARPA-H, DARPA’s original TIA would essentially be making a comeback for all intents and purposes as its own spin-off.
Silicon Valley, the Military and the Wearable “Revolution”
This most recent effort to create ARPA-H/HARPA combines well with the coordinated push of Silicon Valley companies into the field of health care, specifically Silicon Valley companies that double as contractors to US intelligence and/or the military (e.g., Microsoft, Google, and Amazon). During the COVID-19 crisis, this trend toward Silicon Valley dominance of the health-care sector has accelerated considerably due to a top-down push toward digitalization with telemedicine, remote monitoring, and the like.
One interesting example is Amazon, which launched a wearable last year that purports to not only use biometrics to monitor people’s physical health and fitness but to track their emotional state as well. The previous year, Amazon acquired the online pharmacy PillPack, and it is not hard to imagine a scenario in which data from Amazon’s Halo wellness band is used to offer treatment recommendations that are then supplied by Amazon-owned PillPack.
Companies such as Amazon, Palantir, and Google are set to be intimately involved in ARPA-H’s activities. In particular, Google, which launched numerous health-tech initiatives in 2020, is set to have a major role in this new agency due to its long-standing ties to the Obama administration when Biden was vice president and to President Biden’s top science adviser, Eric Lander.
As mentioned, Lander is poised to play a major role in ARPA-H/HARPA if and when it materializes. Before becoming the top scientist in the country, Lander was president and founding director of the Broad Institute. While advertised as a partnership between MIT and Harvard, the Broad Institute is heavily influenced by Silicon Valley, with two former Google executives on its board, a partner of Silicon Valley venture capital firm Greylock Partners, and the former CEO of IBM, as well as some of its top endowments coming from prominent tech executives.
The Broad Institute, Source: https://www.broadinstitute.org
Earlier, in January, the Broad Institute announced that its health-research platform, Terra, which was built with Google subsidiary Verily, would partner with Microsoft. As a result, Terra now allows Google and Microsoft to access a vast trove of genomic data that is poured into the platform by academics and research institutions from around the world.
In addition, last September, Google teamed up with the Department of Defense as part of a new AI-driven “predictive health” program that also has links to the US intelligence community. While initially focused on predicting cancer cases, this initiative clearly plans to expand to predicting the onset of other diseases before symptoms appear, including COVID-19. As noted by Unlimited Hangout at the time, one of the ulterior motives for the program, from Google’s perspective, was for Google to gain access to “the largest repository of disease- and cancer-related medical data in the world,” which is held by the Defense Health Agency. Having exclusive access to this data is a huge boon for Google in its effort to develop and expand its growing suite of AI health-care products.
The military is currently being used to pilot COVID-19–related biometric wearables for “returning to work safely.” Last December, it was announced that Hill Air Force Base in Utah would make biometric wearables a mandatory part of the uniform for some squadrons. For example, the airmen of the Air Force’s 649th Munitions Squadron must now wear a smart watch made by Garmin and a smart ring made by Oura as part of their uniform.
While of interest to the military, these wearables are primarily intended for mass use—a big step toward the infrastructure needed for the resurrection of a bio-surveillance program to be run by the national-security state. Starting first with the military makes sense from the national-security apparatus’s perspective, as the ability to monitor biometric data, including emotions, has obvious appeal for those managing the recently expanded “insider threat” programs in the military and the Department of Homeland Security.
One indicator of the push for mass use is that the same Oura smart ring being used by the Air Force was also recently utilized by the NBA to prevent COVID-19 outbreaks among basketball players. Prior to COVID-19, it was promoted for consumer use by members of the British Royal family and Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey for improving sleep. As recently as last Monday, Oura’s CEO, Harpeet Rai, said that the entire future of wearable health tech will soon be “proactive rather than reactive” because it will focus on predicting disease based on biometric data obtained from wearables in real time.
Another wearable tied to the military that is creeping into mass use is the BioButton and its predecessor the BioSticker. Produced by the company BioIntelliSense, the sleek new BioButton is advertised as a wearable system that is “a scalable and cost-effective solution for COVID-19 symptom monitoring at school, home and work.” BioIntelliSense received $2.8 million from the Pentagon last December to develop the BioButton and BioSticker wearables for COVID-19.
BioIntelliSense CEO James Mault poses with the company’s BioSticker wearable. Source: https://biointellisense.com
BioIntelliSense, cofounded and led by former Microsoft HealthVault developer James Mault, now has its wearable sensors being rolled out for widespread use on some college campuses and at some US hospitals. In some of those instances, the company’s wearables are being used to specifically monitor the side effects of the COVID-19 vaccine as opposed to symptoms of COVID-19 itself. BioIntelliSense is currently running a study, partnered with Philips Healthcare and the University of Colorado, on the use of its wearables for early COVID-19 detection, which is entirely funded by the US military.
While the use of these wearables is currently “encouraged but optional” at these pilot locations, could there come a time when they are mandated in a workplace or by a government? It would not be unheard of, as several countries have already required foreign arrivals to be monitored through use of a wearable during a mandatory quarantine period. Saint Lucia is currently using BioButton for this purpose. Singapore, which seeks to be among the first “smart nations” in the world, has given every single one of its residents a wearable called a “TraceTogether token” for its contact-tracing program. Either the wearable token or the TraceTogether smartphone app is mandatory for all workplaces, shopping malls, hotels, schools, health-care facilities, grocery stores, and hair salons. Those without access to a smartphone are expected to use the “free” government-issued wearable token.
The Era of Digital Dictatorships Is Nearly Here
Making mandatory wearables the new normal not just for COVID-19 prevention but for monitoring health in general would institutionalize quarantining people who have no symptoms of an illness but only an opaque algorithm’s determination that vital signs indicate “abnormal” activity.
Given that no AI is 100 percent accurate and that AI is only as good as the data it is trained on, such a system would be guaranteed to make regular errors: the question is how many. One AI algorithm being used to “predict COVID-19 outbreaks” in Israel and some US states is marketed by Diagnostic Robotics; the (likely inflated) accuracy rate the company provides for its product is only 73 percent. That means, by the company’s own admission, their AI is wrong 27 percent of the time. Probably, it is even less accurate, as the 73 percent figure has never been independently verified.
Adoption of these technologies has benefitted from the COVID-19 crisis, as supporters are seizing the opportunity to accelerate their introduction. As a result, their use will soon become ubiquitous if this advancing agenda continues unimpeded.
Though this push for wearables is obvious now, signs of this agenda were visible several years ago. In 2018, for instance, insurer John Hancock announced that it would replace its life insurance offerings with “interactive policies” that involve individuals having their health monitored by commercial health wearables. Prior to that announcement, John Hancock and other insurers such as Aetna, Cigna, and UnitedHealthcare offered various rewards for policyholders who wore a fitness wearable and shared that data with their insurance company.
In another pre-COVID example, the Journal of the American Medical Associationpublished an article in August 2019 that claimed that wearables “encourage healthy behaviors and empower individuals to participate in their health.” The authors of the article, who are affiliated with Harvard, further claimed that “incentivizing use of these devices [wearables] by integrating them in insurance policies” may be an “attractive” policy approach. The use of wearables for policyholders has since been heavily promoted by the insurance industry, both prior to and after COVID-19, and some speculate that health insurers could soon mandate their use in certain cases or as a broader policy.
These biometric “fitness” devices—such as Amazon’s Halo—can monitor more than your physical vital signs, however, as they can also monitor your emotional state. ARPA-H/HARPA’s flagship SAFE HOME program reveals that the ability to monitor thoughts and feelings is an already existing goal of those seeking to establish this new agency.
According to World Economic Forum luminary and historian Yuval Noah Harari, the transition to “digital dictatorships” will have a “big watershed” moment once governments “start monitoring and surveying what is happening inside your body and inside your brain.” He says that the mass adoption of such technology would make human beings “hackable animals,” while those who abstain from having this technology on or in their bodies would become part of a new “useless” class. Harari has also asserted that biometric wearables will someday be used by governments to target individuals who have the “wrong” emotional reactions to government leaders.
Unsurprisingly, one of Harari’s biggest fans, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, has recently led his company into the development of a comprehensive biometric and “neural” wearable based on technology from a “neural interface” start-up that Facebook acquired in 2019. Per Facebook, the wearable “will integrate with AR [augmented reality], VR [virtual reality], and human neural signals” and is set to become commercially available soon. Facebook also notably owns the VR company Oculus Rift, whose founder, Palmer Luckey, now runs the US military AI contractor Anduril.
As recently reported, Facebook was shaped in its early days to be a private-sector replacement for DARPA’s controversial LifeLog program, which sought to both “humanize” AI and build profiles on domestic dissidents and terror suspects. LifeLog was also promoted by DARPA as “supporting medical research and the early detection of an emerging pandemic.”
It appears that current trends and events show that DARPA’s decades-long effort to merge “health security” and “national security” have now advanced further than ever before. This may partially be because Bill Gates, who has wielded significant influence over health policy globally in the last year, is a long-time advocate of fusing health security and national security to thwart both pandemics and “bioterrorists” before they can strike, as can be heard in his 2017 speech delivered at that year’s Munich Security Conference. That same year, Gates also publicly urged the US military to “focus more training on preparing to fight a global pandemic or bioterror attack.”
In the merging of “national security” and “health security,” any decision or mandate promulgated as a public health measure could be justified as necessary for “national security,” much in the same way that the mass abuses and war crimes that occurred during the post-9/11 “war on terror” were similarly justified by “national security” with little to no oversight. Yet, in this case, instead of only losing our civil liberties and control over our external lives, we stand to lose sovereignty over our individual bodies.
The NIH, which would house this new ARPA-H/HARPA, has spent hundreds of millions of dollars experimenting with the use of wearables since 2015, not only for detecting disease symptoms but also for monitoring individuals’ diets and illegal drug consumption. Biden played a key part in that project, known as the Precision Medicine initiative, and separately highlighted the use of wearables in cancer patients as part of the Obama administration’s related Cancer Moonshot program. The third Obama-era health-research project was the NIH’s BRAIN initiative, which was launched, among other things, to “develop tools to record, mark, and manipulate precisely defined neurons in the living brain” that are determined to be linked to an “abnormal” function or a neurological disease. These initiatives took place at a time when Eric Lander was the cochair of Obama’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology while still leading the Broad Institute. It is hardly a coincidence that Eric Lander is now Biden’s top science adviser, elevated to a new cabinet-level position and set to guide the course of ARPA-H/HARPA.
Thus, Biden’s newly announced agency, if approved by Congress, would integrate those past Obama-era initiatives with Orwellian applications under one roof, but with even less oversight than before. It would also seek to expand and mainstream the uses of these technologies and potentially move toward developing policies that would mandate their use.
If ARPA-H/HARPA is approved by Congress and ultimately established, it will be used to resurrect dangerous and long-standing agendas of the national-security state and its Silicon Valley contractors, creating a “digital dictatorship” that threatens human freedom, human society, and potentially the very definition of what it means to be human.
Transhumanists and Technocrats in Big Pharma have cracked the U.S. government wide open to flood the bioeconomy with taxpayer money and labor to push the frontier of genetic modification of all living things and especially humans. This will ultimately spark the biggest public backlash in modern history.
Biden pledges not only funding but an all-of-government transformation to support this anti-human scheme from top to bottom. It also automatically blocks any agency or department from dissent. ⁃ TN Editor
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of my Administration to coordinate a whole-of-government approach to advance biotechnology and biomanufacturing towards innovative solutions in health, climate change, energy, food security, agriculture, supply chain resilience, and national and economic security. Central to this policy and its outcomes are principles of equity, ethics, safety, and security that enable access to technologies, processes, and products in a manner that benefits all Americans and the global community and that maintains United States technological leadership and economic competitiveness.
Biotechnology harnesses the power of biology to create new services and products, which provide opportunities to grow the United States economy and workforce and improve the quality of our lives and the environment. The economic activity derived from biotechnology and biomanufacturing is referred to as “the bioeconomy.” The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the vital role of biotechnology and biomanufacturing in developing and producing life-saving diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines that protect Americans and the world. Although the power of these technologies is most vivid at the moment in the context of human health, biotechnology and biomanufacturing can also be used to achieve our climate and energy goals, improve food security and sustainability, secure our supply chains, and grow the economy across all of America.
For biotechnology and biomanufacturing to help us achieve our societal goals, the United States needs to invest in foundational scientific capabilities. We need to develop genetic engineering technologies and techniques to be able to write circuitry for cells and predictably program biology in the same way in which we write software and program computers; unlock the power of biological data, including through computing tools and artificial intelligence; and advance the science of scale‑up production while reducing the obstacles for commercialization so that innovative technologies and products can reach markets faster.
Simultaneously, we must take concrete steps to reduce biological risks associated with advances in biotechnology. We need to invest in and promote biosafety and biosecurity to ensure that biotechnology is developed and deployed in ways that align with United States principles and values and international best practices, and not in ways that lead to accidental or deliberate harm to people, animals, or the environment. In addition, we must safeguard the United States bioeconomy, as foreign adversaries and strategic competitors alike use legal and illegal means to acquire United States technologies and data, including biological data, and proprietary or precompetitive information, which threatens United States economic competitiveness and national security.
We also must ensure that uses of biotechnology and biomanufacturing are ethical and responsible; are centered on a foundation of equity and public good, consistent with Executive Order 13985 of January 20, 2021 (Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government); and are consistent with respect for human rights. Resources should be invested justly and equitably so that biotechnology and biomanufacturing technologies benefit all Americans, especially those in underserved communities, as well as the broader global community.
To achieve these objectives, it is the policy of my Administration to:
(a) bolster and coordinate Federal investment in key research and development (R&D) areas of biotechnology and biomanufacturing in order to further societal goals;
(b) foster a biological data ecosystem that advances biotechnology and biomanufacturing innovation, while adhering to principles of security, privacy, and responsible conduct of research;
(c) improve and expand domestic biomanufacturing production capacity and processes, while also increasing piloting and prototyping efforts in biotechnology and biomanufacturing to accelerate the translation of basic research results into practice;
(d) boost sustainable biomass production and create climate-smart incentives for American agricultural producers and forest landowners;
(e) expand market opportunities for bioenergy and biobased products and services;
(f) train and support a diverse, skilled workforce and a next generation of leaders from diverse groups to advance biotechnology and biomanufacturing;
(g) clarify and streamline regulations in service of a science- and risk-based, predictable, efficient, and transparent system to support the safe use of products of biotechnology;
(h) elevate biological risk management as a cornerstone of the life cycle of biotechnology and biomanufacturing R&D, including by providing for research and investment in applied biosafety and biosecurity innovation;
(i) promote standards, establish metrics, and develop systems to grow and assess the state of the bioeconomy; to better inform policy, decision-making, and investments in the bioeconomy; and to ensure equitable and ethical development of the bioeconomy;
(j) secure and protect the United States bioeconomy by adopting a forward‑looking, proactive approach to assessing and anticipating threats, risks, and potential vulnerabilities (including digital intrusion, manipulation, and exfiltration efforts by foreign adversaries), and by partnering with the private sector and other relevant stakeholders to jointly mitigate risks to protect technology leadership and economic competitiveness; and
(k) engage the international community to enhance biotechnology R&D cooperation in a way that is consistent with United States principles and values and that promotes best practices for safe and secure biotechnology and biomanufacturing research, innovation, and product development and use.
The efforts undertaken pursuant to this order to further these policies shall be referred to collectively as the National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative.
Sec. 2. Coordination. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), in consultation with the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (APEP) and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), shall coordinate the executive branch actions necessary to implement this order through the interagency process described in National Security Memorandum 2 of February 4, 2021 (Renewing the National Security Council System) (NSM-2 process). In implementing this order, heads of agencies (as defined in section 13 of this order) shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, consult outside stakeholders, such as those in industry; academia; nongovernmental organizations; communities; labor unions; and State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments to advance the policies described in section 1 of this order.
Sec. 3. Harnessing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing R&D to Further Societal Goals. (a) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the heads of agencies specified in subsections (a)(i)-(v) of this section shall submit the following reports on biotechnology and biomanufacturing to further societal goals related to health, climate change and energy, food and agricultural innovation, resilient supply chains, and cross-cutting scientific advances. The reports shall be submitted to the President through the APNSA, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the APEP, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy (APDP), and the Director of OSTP.
(i) The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies as determined by the Secretary, shall submit a report assessing how to use biotechnology and biomanufacturing to achieve medical breakthroughs, reduce the overall burden of disease, and improve health outcomes.
(ii) The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies as determined by the Secretary, shall submit a report assessing how to use biotechnology, biomanufacturing, bioenergy, and biobased products to address the causes and adapt to and mitigate the impacts of climate change, including by sequestering carbon and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
(iii) The Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies as determined by the Secretary, shall submit a report assessing how to use biotechnology and biomanufacturing for food and agriculture innovation, including by improving sustainability and land conservation; increasing food quality and nutrition; increasing and protecting agricultural yields; protecting against plant and animal pests and diseases; and cultivating alternative food sources.
(iv) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of HHS, and the heads of other appropriate agencies as determined by the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report assessing how to use biotechnology and biomanufacturing to strengthen the resilience of United States supply chains.
(v) The Director of the National Science Foundation (NSF), in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies as determined by the Director, shall submit a report identifying high-priority fundamental and use‑inspired basic research goals to advance biotechnology and biomanufacturing and to address the societal goals identified in this section.
(b) Each report specified in subsection (a) of this section shall identify high-priority basic research and technology development needs to achieve the overall objectives described in subsection (a) of this section, as well as opportunities for public-private collaboration. Each of these reports shall also include recommendations for actions to enhance biosafety and biosecurity to reduce risk throughout the biotechnology R&D and biomanufacturing lifecycles.
(c) Within 100 days of receiving the reports required under subsection (a) of this section, the Director of OSTP, in coordination with the Director of OMB, the APNSA, the APEP, the APDP, and the heads of appropriate agencies as determined through the NSM-2 process, shall develop a plan (implementation plan) to implement the recommendations in the reports. The development of this implementation plan shall also include the solicitation of input from external experts regarding potential ethical implications or other societal impacts, including environmental sustainability and environmental justice, of the recommendations contained in the reports required under subsection (a) of this section. The implementation plan shall include assessments and make recommendations regarding any such implications or impacts.
(d) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Director of OMB, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies as determined through the NSM-2 process, shall perform a budget crosscut to identify existing levels of agency spending on biotechnology- and biomanufacturing-related activities to inform the development of the implementation plan described in subsection (c) of this section.
(e) The APNSA, in coordination with the Director of OMB, the APEP, the APDP, and the Director of OSTP, shall review the reports required under subsection (a) of this section and shall submit the reports to the President in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(f) The APNSA, in coordination with the Director of OMB, the APEP, the APDP, and the Director of OSTP, shall include a cover memorandum for the reports submitted pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, along with the implementation plan required under subsection (c) of this section, in which they make any additional overall recommendations for advancing biotechnology and biomanufacturing.
(g) Within 2 years of the date of this order, agencies at which recommendations are directed in the implementation plan required under subsection (c) of this section shall report to the Director of OMB, the APNSA, the APEP, the APDP, and the Director of OSTP on measures taken and resources allocated to enhance biotechnology and biomanufacturing, consistent with the implementation plan described in subsection (c) of this section.
(h) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology shall submit to the President and make publicly available a report on the bioeconomy that provides recommendations on how to maintain United States competitiveness in the global bioeconomy.
Sec. 4. Data for the Bioeconomy. (a) In order to facilitate development of the United States bioeconomy, my Administration shall establish a Data for the Bioeconomy Initiative (Data Initiative) that will ensure that high-quality, wide-ranging, easily accessible, and secure biological data sets can drive breakthroughs for the United States bioeconomy. To assist in the development of the Data Initiative, the Director of OSTP, in coordination with the Director of OMB and the heads of appropriate agencies as determined by the Director of OSTP, and in consultation with external stakeholders, shall issue a report within 240 days of the date of this order that:
(i) identifies the data types and sources, to include genomic and multiomic information, that are most critical to drive advances in health, climate, energy, food, agriculture, and biomanufacturing, as well as other bioeconomy-related R&D, along with any data gaps;
(ii) sets forth a plan to fill any data gaps and make new and existing public data findable, accessible, interoperable, and reusable in ways that are equitable, standardized, secure, and transparent, and that are integrated with platforms that enable the use of advanced computing tools;
(iii) identifies — based on the data types and sources described in subsection (a)(i) of this section — security, privacy, and other risks (such as malicious misuses, manipulation, exfiltration, and deletion), and provides a data-protection plan to mitigate these risks; and
(iv) outlines the Federal resources, legal authorities, and actions needed to support the Data Initiative and achieve the goals outlined in this subsection, with a timeline for action.
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce (acting through the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)), the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of OMB, shall identify and recommend relevant cybersecurity best practices for biological data stored on Federal Government information systems, consistent with applicable law and Executive Order 14028 of May 12, 2021 (Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity).
(c) The Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST and in coordination with the Secretary of HHS, shall consider bio-related software, including software for laboratory equipment, instrumentation, and data management, in establishing baseline security standards for the development of software sold to the United States Government, consistent with section 4 of Executive Order 14028.
Sec. 5. Building a Vibrant Domestic Biomanufacturing Ecosystem. (a) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the APNSA and the APEP, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of NSF, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), shall develop a strategy that identifies policy recommendations to expand domestic biomanufacturing capacity for products spanning the health, energy, agriculture, and industrial sectors, with a focus on advancing equity, improving biomanufacturing processes, and connecting relevant infrastructure. Additionally, this strategy shall identify actions to mitigate risks posed by foreign adversary involvement in the biomanufacturing supply chain and to enhance biosafety, biosecurity, and cybersecurity in new and existing infrastructure.
(b) Agencies identified in subsections (b)(i)-(iv) of this section shall direct resources, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, towards the creation or expansion of programs that support a vibrant domestic biomanufacturing ecosystem, as informed by the strategy developed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section:
(i) the NSF shall expand its existing Regional Innovation Engine program to advance emerging technologies, including biotechnology;
(ii) the Department of Commerce shall address challenges in biomanufacturing supply chains and related biotechnology development infrastructure;
(iii) the Department of Defense shall incentivize the expansion of domestic, flexible industrial biomanufacturing capacity for a wide range of materials that can be used to make a diversity of products for the defense supply chain; and
(iv) the Department of Energy shall support research to accelerate bioenergy and bioproduct science advances, to accelerate biotechnology and bioinformatics tool development, and to reduce the hurdles to commercialization, including through incentivizing the engineering scale-up of promising biotechnologies and the expansion of biomanufacturing capacity.
(c) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies as determined by the Secretary, shall submit a plan to the President, through the APNSA and the APEP, to support the resilience of the United States biomass supply chain for domestic biomanufacturing and biobased product manufacturing, while also advancing food security, environmental sustainability, and the needs of underserved communities. This plan shall include programs to encourage climate-smart production and use of domestic biomass, along with budget estimates, including accounting for funds appropriated for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 and proposed in the President’s FY 2023 Budget.
(d) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of appropriate agencies as determined by the Secretary, shall:
(i) provide the APNSA with vulnerability assessments of the critical infrastructure and national critical functions associated with the bioeconomy, including cyber, physical, and systemic risks, and recommendations to secure and make resilient these components of our infrastructure and economy; and
(ii) enhance coordination with industry on threat information sharing, vulnerability disclosure, and risk mitigation for cybersecurity and infrastructure risks to the United States bioeconomy, including risks to biological data and related physical and digital infrastructure and devices. This coordination shall be informed in part by the assessments described in subsection (d)(i) of this section.
Sec. 6. Biobased Products Procurement. (a) Consistent with the requirements of 7 U.S.C. 8102, within 1 year of the date of this order, procuring agencies as defined in 7 U.S.C. 8102(a)(1)(A) that have not yet established a biobased procurement program as described in 7 U.S.C. 8102(a)(2) shall establish such a program.
(b) Procuring agencies shall require that, within 2 years of the date of this order, all appropriate staff (including contracting officers, purchase card managers, and purchase card holders) complete training on biobased product purchasing. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy, within OMB, in cooperation with the Secretary of Agriculture, shall provide training materials for procuring agencies.
(c) Within 180 days of the date of this order and annually thereafter, procuring agencies shall report previous fiscal year spending to the Director of OMB on the following:
(i) the number and dollar value of contracts entered into during the previous fiscal year that include the direct procurement of biobased products;
(ii) the number of service and construction (including renovations) contracts entered into during the previous fiscal year that include language on the use of biobased products; and
(iii) the types and dollar values of biobased products actually used by contractors in carrying out service and construction (including renovations) contracts during the previous fiscal year.
(d) The requirements in subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to purchase card transactions and other “[a]ctions not reported” to the Federal Procurement Data System pursuant to 48 CFR 4.606(c).
(e) Within 1 year of the date of this order and annually thereafter, the Director of OMB shall publish information on biobased procurement resulting from the data collected under subsection (c) of this section and information reported under 7 U.S.C. 8102, along with other related information, and shall use scorecards or similar systems to encourage increased biobased purchasing.
(f) Within 1 year of the date of this order and annually thereafter, procuring agencies shall report to the Secretary of Agriculture specific categories of biobased products that are unavailable to meet their procurement needs, along with desired performance standards for currently unavailable products and other relevant specifications. The Secretary of Agriculture shall publish this information annually. When new categories of biobased products become commercially available, the Secretary of Agriculture shall designate new product categories for preferred Federal procurement, as prescribed by 7 U.S.C. 8102.
(g) Procuring agencies shall strive to increase by 2025 the amount of biobased product obligations or the number or dollar value of biobased-only contracts, as reflected in the information described in subsection (c) of this section, and as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.
Sec. 7. Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Workforce. (a) The United States Government shall expand training and education opportunities for all Americans in biotechnology and biomanufacturing. To support this objective, within 200 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Education, the APDP, the Director of OSTP, and the Director of NSF shall produce and make publicly available a plan to coordinate and use relevant Federal education and training programs, while also recommending new efforts to promote multi-disciplinary education programs. This plan shall promote the implementation of formal and informal education and training (such as opportunities at technical schools and certificate programs), career and technical education, and expanded career pathways into existing degree programs for biotechnology and biomanufacturing. This plan shall also include a focused discussion of Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Tribal Colleges and Universities, and Minority Serving Institutions and the extent to which agencies can use existing statutory authorities to promote racial and gender equity and support underserved communities, consistent with the policy established in Executive Order 13985. Finally, this plan shall account for funds appropriated for FY 2022 and proposed in the President’s FY 2023 Budget.
(b) Within 2 years of the date of this order, agencies that support relevant Federal education and training programs as described in subsection (a) of this section shall report to the President through the APNSA, in coordination with the Director of OMB, the ADPD, and the Director of OSTP, on measures taken and resources allocated to enhance workforce development pursuant to the plan described in subsection (a) of this section.
Sec. 8. Biotechnology Regulation Clarity and Efficiency. Advances in biotechnology are rapidly altering the product landscape. The complexity of the current regulatory system for biotechnology products can be confusing and create challenges for businesses to navigate. To improve the clarity and efficiency of the regulatory process for biotechnology products, and to enable products that further the societal goals identified in section 3 of this order, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, in coordination with the Director of OMB, the ADPD, and the Director of OSTP, shall:
(a) within 180 days of the date of this order, identify areas of ambiguity, gaps, or uncertainties in the January 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology or in the policy changes made pursuant to Executive Order 13874 of June 11, 2019 (Modernizing the Regulatory Framework for Agricultural Biotechnology Products), including by engaging with developers and external stakeholders, and through horizon scanning for novel products of biotechnology;
(b) within 100 days of completing the task in subsection (a) of this section, provide to the general public plain-language information regarding the regulatory roles, responsibilities, and processes of each agency, including which agency or agencies are responsible for oversight of different types of products developed with biotechnology, with case studies, as appropriate;
(c) within 280 days of the date of this order, provide a plan to the Director of OMB, the ADPD, and the Director of OSTP with processes and timelines to implement regulatory reform, including identification of the regulations and guidance documents that can be updated, streamlined, or clarified; and identification of potential new guidance or regulations, where needed;
(d) within 1 year of the date of this order, build on the Unified Website for Biotechnology Regulation developed pursuant to Executive Order 13874 by including on the website the information developed under subsection (b) of this section, and by enabling developers of biotechnology products to submit inquiries about a particular product and promptly receive a single, coordinated response that provides, to the extent practicable, information and, when appropriate, informal guidance regarding the process that the developers must follow for Federal regulatory review; and
(e) within 1 year of the date of this order, and annually thereafter for a period of 3 years, provide an update regarding progress in implementing this section to the Director of OMB, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the APNSA, the ADPD, and the Director of OSTP. Each 1-year update shall identify any gaps in statutory authority that should be addressed to improve the clarity and efficiency of the regulatory process for biotechnology products, and shall recommend additional executive actions and legislative proposals to achieve such goals.
Sec. 9. Reducing Risk by Advancing Biosafety and Biosecurity. (a) The United States Government shall launch a Biosafety and Biosecurity Innovation Initiative, which shall seek to reduce biological risks associated with advances in biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and the bioeconomy. Through the Biosafety and Biosecurity Innovation Initiative — which shall be established by the Secretary of HHS, in coordination with the heads of other relevant agencies as determined by the Secretary — agencies that fund, conduct, or sponsor life sciences research shall implement the following actions, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law:
(i) support, as a priority, investments in applied biosafety research and innovations in biosecurity to reduce biological risk throughout the biotechnology R&D and biomanufacturing lifecycles; and
(ii) use Federal investments in biotechnology and biomanufacturing to incentivize and enhance biosafety and biosecurity practices and best practices throughout the United States and international research enterprises.
(b) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of HHS and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with agencies that fund, conduct, or sponsor life sciences research, shall produce a plan for biosafety and biosecurity for the bioeconomy, including recommendations to:
(i) enhance applied biosafety research and bolster innovations in biosecurity to reduce risk throughout the biotechnology R&D and biomanufacturing lifecycles; and
(ii) use Federal investments in biological sciences, biotechnology, and biomanufacturing to enhance biosafety and biosecurity best practices throughout the bioeconomy R&D enterprise.
(c) Within 1 year of the date of this order, agencies that fund, conduct, or sponsor life sciences research shall report to the APNSA, through the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor, on efforts to achieve the objectives described in subsection (a) of this section.
Sec. 10. Measuring the Bioeconomy. (a) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, through the Director of NIST, shall, in consultation with other agencies as determined by the Director, industry, and other stakeholders, as appropriate, create and make publicly available a lexicon for the bioeconomy, with consideration of relevant domestic and international definitions and with the goal of assisting in the development of measurements and measurement methods for the bioeconomy that support uses such as economic measurement, risk assessments, and the application of machine learning and other artificial intelligence tools.
(b) The Chief Statistician of the United States, in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of NSF, and the heads of other appropriate agencies as determined by the Chief Statistician, shall improve and enhance Federal statistical data collection designed to characterize the economic value of the United States bioeconomy, with a focus on the contribution of biotechnology to the bioeconomy. This effort shall include:
(i) within 180 days of the date of this order, assessing, through the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, the feasibility, scope, and costs of developing a national measurement of the economic contributions of the bioeconomy, and, in particular, the contributions of biotechnology to the bioeconomy, including recommendations and a plan for next steps regarding whether development of such a measurement should be pursued; and
(ii) within 120 days of the date of this order, establishing an Interagency Technical Working Group (ITWG), chaired by the Chief Statistician of the United States, which shall include representatives of the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, OSTP, the NSF, and other appropriate agencies as determined by the Chief Statistician of the United States.
(A) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the ITWG shall recommend bioeconomy-related revisions to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and the North American Product Classification System (NAPCS) to the Economic Classification Policy Committee. In 2026, the ITWG shall initiate a review process of the 2023 recommendations and update the recommendations, as appropriate, to provide input to the 2027 NAICS and NAPCS revision processes.
(B) Within 18 months of the date of this order, the ITWG shall provide a report to the Chief Statistician of the United States describing the Federal statistical collections of information that take advantage of bioeconomy-related NAICS and NAPCS codes, and shall include recommendations to implement any bioeconomy-related changes as part of the 2022 revisions of the NAICS and NAPCS. As part of its work, the ITWG shall consult with external stakeholders.
Sec. 11. Assessing Threats to the United States Bioeconomy. (a) The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) shall lead a comprehensive interagency assessment of ongoing, emerging, and future threats to United States national security from foreign adversaries against the bioeconomy and from foreign adversary development and application of biotechnology and biomanufacturing, including acquisition of United States capabilities, technologies, and biological data. As part of this effort, the DNI shall work closely with the Department of Defense to assess technical applications of biotechnology and biomanufacturing that could be misused by a foreign adversary for military purposes or that could otherwise pose a risk to the United States. In support of these objectives, the DNI shall identify elements of the bioeconomy of highest concern and establish processes to support ongoing threat identification and impact assessments.
(b) Within 240 days of the date of this order, the DNI shall provide classified assessments to the APNSA related to:
(i) threats to United States national and economic security posed by foreign adversary development and application of biomanufacturing; and
(ii) foreign adversary means of, and intended usages related to, acquisition of United States biotechnologies, biological data, and proprietary or precompetitive information.
(c) Within 120 days of receiving the DNI’s assessments, the APNSA shall coordinate with the heads of relevant agencies as determined through the NSM-2 process to develop and finalize a plan to mitigate risks to the United States bioeconomy, based upon the threat identification and impact assessments described in subsection (a) of this section, the vulnerability assessments described in section 5(d) of this order, and other relevant assessments or information. The plan shall identify where executive action, regulatory action, technology protection, or statutory authorities are needed to mitigate these risks in order to support the technology leadership and economic competitiveness of the United States bioeconomy.
(d) The United States Government contracts with a variety of providers to support its functioning, including by contracting for services related to the bioeconomy. It is important that these contracts are awarded according to full and open competition, as consistent with the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175). In accordance with these objectives, and within 1 year of the date of this order, the Director of OSTP, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the DNI, the Administrator of NASA, and the Administrator of General Services, shall review the national security implications of existing requirements related to Federal procurement — including requirements contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement — and shall recommend updates to those requirements to the FAR Council, the Director of OMB, and the heads of other appropriate agencies as determined through the NSM-2 process. The recommendations shall aim to standardize pre-award data collection to enable due diligence review of conflict of interest; conflict of commitment; foreign ownership, control, or influence; or other potential national security concerns. The recommendations shall also include legislative proposals, as relevant.
(e) The Director of OMB shall issue a management memorandum to agencies, or take other appropriate action, to provide generalized guidance based on the recommendations received pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.
Sec. 12. International Engagement. (a) The Department of State and other agencies that engage with international partners as part of their missions shall undertake the following actions with foreign partners, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law — with a specific focus on developing countries, international organizations, and nongovernmental entities — to promote and protect both the United States and global bioeconomies:
(i) enhance cooperation, including joint research projects and expert exchanges, on biotechnology R&D, especially in genomics;
(ii) encourage regulatory cooperation and the adoption of best practices to evaluate and promote innovative products, with an emphasis on those practices and products that support sustainability and climate objectives;
(iii) develop joint training arrangements and initiatives to support bioeconomy jobs in the United States;
(iv) work to promote the open sharing of scientific data, including genetic sequence data, to the greatest extent possible in accordance with applicable law and policy, while seeking to ensure that any applicable access and benefit-sharing mechanisms do not hinder the rapid and sustainable development of innovative products and biotechnologies;
(v) conduct horizon scanning to anticipate threats to the global bioeconomy, including national security threats from foreign adversaries acquiring sensitive technologies or data, or disrupting essential bio-related supply chains, and to identify opportunities to address those threats;
(vi) engage allies and partners to address shared national security threats;
(vii) develop, and work to promote and implement, biosafety and biosecurity best practices, tools, and resources bilaterally and multilaterally to facilitate appropriate oversight for life sciences, dual-use research of concern, and research involving potentially pandemic and other high-consequence pathogens, and to enhance sound risk management of biotechnology- and biomanufacturing-related R&D globally; and
(viii) explore how to align international classifications of biomanufactured products, as appropriate, to measure the value of those products to both the United States and global bioeconomies.
(b) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the USTR and the heads of other agencies as determined by the Secretary, as appropriate, shall submit to the APNSA a plan to support the objectives described in subsection (a) of this section with foreign partners, international organizations, and nongovernmental entities.
Sec. 13. Definitions. For purposes of this order:
(a) The term “agency” has the meaning given that term by 44 U.S.C. 3502(1).
(b) The term “biotechnology” means technology that applies to or is enabled by life sciences innovation or product development.
(c) The term “biomanufacturing” means the use of biological systems to develop products, tools, and processes at commercial scale.
(d) The term “bioeconomy” means economic activity derived from the life sciences, particularly in the areas of biotechnology and biomanufacturing, and includes industries, products, services, and the workforce.
(e) The term “biological data” means the information, including associated descriptors, derived from the structure, function, or process of a biological system(s) that is measured, collected, or aggregated for analysis.
(f) The term “biomass” means any material of biological origin that is available on a renewable or recurring basis. Examples of biomass include plants, trees, algae, and waste material such as crop residue, wood waste, animal waste and byproducts, food waste, and yard waste.
(g) The term “biobased product” has the meaning given that term in 7 U.S.C. 8101(4).
(h) The term “bioenergy” means energy derived in whole or in significant part from biomass.
(i) The term “multiomic information” refers to combined information derived from data, analysis, and interpretation of multiple omics measurement technologies to identify or analyze the roles, relationships, and functions of biomolecules (including nucleic acids, proteins, and metabolites) that make up a cell or cellular system. Omics are disciplines in biology that include genomics, transcriptomics, proteomics, and metabolomics.
(j) The term “key R&D areas” includes fundamental R&D of emerging biotechnologies, including engineering biology; predictive engineering of complex biological systems, including the designing, building, testing, and modeling of entire living cells, cell components, or cellular systems; quantitative and theory-driven multi-disciplinary research to maximize convergence with other enabling technologies; and regulatory science, including the development of new information, criteria, tools, models, and approaches to inform and assist regulatory decision-making. These R&D priorities should be coupled with advances in predictive modeling, data analytics, artificial intelligence, bioinformatics, high-performance and other advanced computing systems, metrology and data-driven standards, and other non-life science enabling technologies.
(k) The terms “equity” and “underserved communities” have the meanings given those terms by sections 2(a) and 2(b) of Executive Order 13985.
(l) The term “Tribal Colleges and Universities” has the meaning given that term by section 5(e) of Executive Order 14049 of October 11, 2021 (White House Initiative on Advancing Educational Equity, Excellence, and Economic Opportunity for Native Americans and Strengthening Tribal Colleges and Universities).
(m) The term “Historically Black Colleges and Universities” has the meaning given that term by section 4(b) of Executive Order 14041 of September 3, 2021 (White House Initiative on Advancing Educational Equity, Excellence, and Economic Opportunity Through Historically Black Colleges and Universities).
(n) The term “minority serving institution” has the meaning given that term by 38 U.S.C. 3698(f)(4).
(o) The term “foreign adversary” has the meaning given that term by section 3(b) of Executive Order 14034 of June 9, 2021 (Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries).
(p) The term “life sciences” means all sciences that study or use living organisms, viruses, or their products, including all disciplines of biology and all applications of the biological sciences (including biotechnology, genomics, proteomics, bioinformatics, and pharmaceutical and biomedical research and techniques), but excluding scientific studies associated with radioactive materials or toxic chemicals that are not of biological origin or synthetic analogues of toxins.
Sec. 14. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
The results below are listed in microwatts per meter squared, a standard unit of measure for wireless radiation emissions from cell towers and antennas. The “safe” exposure level, according to the research, is 10 or below. Anything above that is considered biologically harmful. As you can see, almost all levels are far above 10 microwatts per meter squared.
The Safe & Sound Pro II measures the Peak, Maximum and Average radiation levels. Below we have noted only the Maximum, since the human body does not experience in “averages” and peak levels fluctuate. The maximum is the highest level measured at a given location.
The EMF testing project was time and labor intensive. It was a labor of love. We hope the results will be shared far and wide and will be used to inform citizens, educators, health care practitioners, and law makers of the harm from wireless radiation.
The key is understanding “general authority,” (47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A)) where the United States Congress preserved general authority to local governments to regulate placement, siting, maintenance, operations, and construction of cell towers and other wireless facilities within their jurisdictions.
It is necessary for communities to take control at the local level to strengthen wireless ordinances in order to assert their authority and protect residents.
The far reaching decision on July 29, 2022, in Extenet Systems Inc v. The Village of Flower Hill, underscores the general authority of local governments and communities to control the placement of wireless facilities within their jurisdictions.
Local governments have been misinformed by municipal lawyers and consultants regarding the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA) as to general authority by local jurisdictions to prevent irresponsible placement of cell towers and other wireless facilities.
A Senior United States District Court Judge in the Eastern District of New York rejected the FCC Order and issued two significant determinations in the Extenet Systems Inc. v. The Village of Flower Hill decision:
The FCC order trying to strip local authority of power to regulate placement of wireless facilities is not binding upon federal Courts in New York nor is it binding upon local governments in New York;
2. Before they can sue a Town, City, Village or County, a wireless company must provide verifiable evidence to the local zoning board that a significant gap in personal wireless service exists. Additionally, the wireless company must prove that the new installation provides the least intrusive means in filling the gap.
The federal judge has made clear that local governments have the power to control the number and placement of wireless facilities in their jurisdictions, as intentionally preserved to them by Congress.
“…the statute requires that the corporation must “first obtain from . . . the trustees of villages . . . permission to use the streets within such . . . village . . . for the purposes herein set forth.” -p.13
The Flower Hill case underscores the authority of communities and local governments to enact strong local zoning provisions to protect residents from a blight of uncontrolled wireless infrastructure deployment.
A cell phone is a constant companion for most people. The fact that invasive apps on these ‘smart’ devices are continuously surveilling the user, data mining and monetizing the data, and collecting and storing your confidential information, is not something that people generally realize. Rex Lee, cybersecurity advisor says that a lot of times the government can end up with your information.
This surveillance infrastructure of technocracy, or scientific dictatorship, is built upon the 4G-5G-6G+AI systems. We’re far beyond the internet of things. This control is about the Internet of Bodies, the installation of a permanent digital prison where every living being will essentially become a node on the internet.
Once people understand the threat, immediate steps can be taken to increase security, strengthen local control to preventfurtherdeployment of this potential weapon system, and regulate the infrastructure in order to protect human rights, health, the environment and liberty. -JD
‘They Can Do Audio, Video, Physical Surveillance on You 24H/365D a Year’: Rex Lee on Intrusive Apps
In this special episode, we sat down with Rex M. Lee, cybersecurity adviser at My Smart Privacy. He helps shed light on China’s cyberattacks on America, how they affect us in our daily lives, and what can be done to stop them.
Lee notes one way adversarial countries can get in is through invasive apps: “You have to look at an app as legal malware. And that’s the best way you can describe apps today. An app—whether it’s a social media app developed by Bytedance, such as TikTok, or Facebook, or Instagram—any of these apps, they are basically legal malware that enable the developer to monitor, track, and data mine the end user for financial gain 24 by seven, 365 days a year.
“A single intrusive app enables the developer to collect over 5,000 highly confidential data points associated with the end user’s personal information, business information, medical information, legal information, and employment information because the surveillance and data mining done by these companies is indiscriminate, meaning that they’re not only collecting consumer information, they’re collecting every bit of information from the end user, including text messages, email, email attachments, calendar events, and so forth,” he added.
As to just how invasive these are, Lee said: “What an app will do is it will interlink with all of the hardware on the device and the sensors on the device, such as camera and microphone, as well as sensors, such as the accelerometer. So they can do audio, video and physical surveillance on you 24 hours, 365 days a year while collecting those 5,000 highly confidential data points on the end user. What they’re doing is they package that and they monetize it. But also, as we’re seeing in the news, is that these tech companies are aligned with governments. So the information a lot of times is ending up in the hands of the government.”
Recent Study Examines Bioeffects of Radiofrequency Radiation ( RFR )
August 12, 2022 | Zero5G.com | This study examines negative consequences of Radiofrequency Radiation ( RFR ) on the human immune system, evaluates RFR modulation impacts on immune cells, and references evidence of RFR as an environmental pollutant.
Growing evidence recommends that radiofrequency radiations might be a new type of environmental pollutant. The consequences of RFR on the human immune system have gained considerable interest in recent years, not only to examine probable negative effects on health but also to understand if RFR can modulate the immune response positively. Although several studies have been published on the immune effects of RFR but no satisfactory agreement has been reached. Hence this review aims to evaluate the RFR modulating impacts on particular immune cells contributing to various innate or adaptive immune responses. In view of existing pieces of evidence, we have suggested an intracellular signaling cascade responsible for RFR action. The bio-effects of RFR on immune cell morphology, viability, proliferation, genome integrity, and immune functions such as ROS, cytokine secretion, phagocytosis, apoptosis, etc. are discussed.
More scrutiny is needed to understand the real motivation for Ms. Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan. What is clear is that Americans will be spending millions of dollars on her travel expenses and security for a trip that is serving to unnecessarily increase tensions with China.
Behind the claim that Ms. Pelosi is showing support for Taiwan, the real reason may be in regard to her husband’s financial ties with NVIDIA, a world leader in Artificial Intelligence computing.
Two days prior to the passage of the CHIPs Act, Ms. Pelosi disclosed selling 25,000 shares of NVIDIA, at a value between $1,000,00 and $5,000,000.
Far from representing American interests, Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan appears as though it may be related to activities following insider trading.
From ‘virus’activation to extreme violence, could the dramatic rise of neurological and physiological damage to human beings be the result of exponential increases in exposure to microwave radiation (MWR)?
Tragically, no agencies are measuring or protecting populations and our environment from exposure to MWR. This inconvenient truth facing human beings worldwide presents our “Roman moment”, an opportunity to change direction away from a dangerous path, not only for humankind, but for all life on Earth. Link
The technocratic goal of constant biometric surveillance and tracking every living being with nanochips via wireless sensor networks, is anti-human and anti-American. -JD
Researchers at the University of Illinois Chicago have successfully used graphene—one of the strongest, thinnest known materials—to detect the SARS-CoV-2 virus in laboratory experiments. The researchers say the discovery could be a breakthrough in coronavirus detection, with potential applications in the fight against COVID-19 and its variants.
In experiments, researchers combined sheets of graphene, which are more than 1,000 times thinner than a postage stamp, with an antibody designed to target the infamous spike protein on the coronavirus. They then measured the atomic-level vibrations of these graphene sheets when exposed to COVID-positive and COVID-negative samples in artificial saliva. These sheets were also tested in the presence of other coronaviruses, like Middle East respiratory syndrome, or MERS-CoV.
Their findings are published today in the journal ACS Nano.
“We have been developing graphene sensors for many years. In the past, we have built detectors for cancer cells and ALS. It is hard to imagine a more pressing application than to help stem the spread of the current pandemic,” said Vikas Berry, professor and head of chemical engineering at the UIC College of Engineering and senior author of the paper. “There is a clear need in society for better ways to quickly and accurately detect COVID and its variants, and this research has the potential to make a real difference. The modified sensor is highly sensitive and selective for COVID, and it is fast and inexpensive.”
“This project has been an amazingly novel response to the need and demand for detection of viruses, quickly and accurately,” said study co-author Garrett Lindemann, a researcher with Carbon Advanced Materials and Products, or CAMP. “The development of this technology as a clinical testing device has many advantages over the currently deployed and used tests.”
Berry says that graphene has unique properties that make it highly versatile, making this type of sensor possible.
Graphene is a single-atom-thick material made up of carbon. Carbon atoms are bound by chemical bonds whose elasticity and movement can produce resonant vibrations, also known as phonons, which can be very accurately measured. When a molecule like a SARS-CoV-2 molecule interacts with graphene, it changes these resonant vibrations in a very specific and quantifiable way.
“Graphene is just one atom thick, so a molecule on its surface is relatively enormous and can produce a specific change in its electronic energy,” Berry said. “In this experiment, we modified graphene with an antibody and, in essence, calibrated it to react only with the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein. Using this method, graphene could similarly be used to detect COVID-19 variants.”
The researchers say the potential applications for a graphene atomic-level sensor—from detecting COVID to ALS to cancer—continue to expand.
Former Google CEO Issues Warning: Negotiations Urgently Needed To Address AI Dangers
Eric Schmidt discusses some of the major challenges of Artificial Intelligence( AI ), from the lack of understanding and naiveté about the potential impact of AI twenty years ago, to the need for governments and other institutions to put more pressure on tech now, to get the technology consistent with our values (as a free society).
Schmidt urges negotiations to solve national security issues surrounding AI and to prevent a conundrum resulting from lack of preparedness and diplomacy.
The participants in this forum are many of the same technocratic entities and organizations linked with the political ruling class, big tech, private corporations, the military-industrial- intelligence-pharmaceutical-complex, with the Rockefeller Foundation as a partner.
As usual, the American people have absolutely zero input, and no role whatsoever in the decisions being made by this elite group. -JD